UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Case No. 2:13-md-02460

IN RE:

. U.S. Courthouse

NIASPAN ANTITRUST

. 601 Market Street

LITIGATION

Philadelphia, PA 19106

. December 12, 2019

. 11:52 a.m.

TRANSCRIPT OF TELEPHONE CONFERENCE BEFORE THE HONORABLE JAN E. DUBOIS UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

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(Proceedings commence at 11:52 a.m.)

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THE COURT: This is Judge DuBois. We're going to conduct a very brief telephone conference for the purpose of addressing the class-action notice for the DPP class in the 5 Niaspan Antitrust Litigation. This call is being recorded, and 6 I'm going to identify the categories of parties who are represented.

Interim -- well, I think it's -- I don't think it's Interim Liaison Counsel any longer. I think it's class counsel $10\,\parallel$ for the Direct Purchaser Class, the DPP class are represented by Mr. Sorenson and his associates. Interim Liaison Counsel for defendants, Mr. Saint-Antoine and several others. defendants are represented by Devora Allon. Walgreen 14 plaintiffs by Scott Perwin, and CVS plaintiffs by Monica Kiley.

I didn't mean to exclude the retailer plaintiffs, but 16 the purpose of this call was so mechanical, I mean, it's really not substantive. It's to clarify some issues, and I thought 18 that the more parties I directed be on the line, the longer it 19 would take to schedule, and it's already taken too long, but 20 that was my reason for limiting the participants.

All right. Now let's get started. Let's start with 22 the form of order numbered paragraph 2 on page 2. I find the 23 reference to 14 days of the entry of this order to be inexact. The order sometimes doesn't get entered immediately, and I 25 thought that should be changed, either to a specific date, and

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1 I'm going to address that issue, the use of specific dates $2 \parallel$ later, but if we're going to stay with the date of the entry of the order, we should just simply say the date of the order, the date on the order.

But I'm inclined to think -- and I've done this -- I 6 can't recall a case where we keyed things that had to happen to dates of mailing and dates of the entry of an order. More often than not, and I'm thinking in almost every case, if not every case, we use specific dates. That's my comment with 10 respect to paragraph 2.

The same thing in paragraph 4, and that's even more 12 diaphanous, within no later than 35 days from the mailing of 13 the notice. That's a very inexact way of referring to a date.

In paragraph 5, again, talks about the date of the entry of the order.

Paragraph 3 of the order refers to the notice being in substantially the same form. Why reference to 18 substantially? I did not get that.

And, finally, you've got my signature hanging out there alone on page 3 and I don't like that. It raises all sorts of issues. Anything can be plugged into pages 1 and 2. I'm not suggesting that you would do it, but it certainly makes for manipulation and bad practice.

I've raised a number of, I think, rather simple 25 issues to resolve. Let's talk about them. First, dates. ■ 1 there any reason why we can't use specific dates? I'll sign 2 the order, because I -- the only changes I have to propose in 3 the notice, really, to the dates for doing things, not the $4 \parallel$ number of days, but the way you've articulated when that must 5 be done.

All right.

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MR. SORENSON: Your Honor, this is -- yeah, this is David Sorenson. Yes, of course, we can change the -- change it to the date of a specific date.

THE COURT: Well, then, let's do that. When can you 11 \parallel get the order back to me? I suppose it can be done today.

MR. SORENSON: We'll get it back to you today. Yes.

THE COURT: All right. Then I'll sign it today.

MR. SORENSON: Okay.

THE COURT: And so we can plug in a specific date, 16 which would be 14 days, or we can do it from tomorrow. I have a pretty heavy-duty sentencing this afternoon. I'm not sure whether I'll finish in time to get mail out at the day end, so 19 make it 14 days -- key everything from tomorrow.

MR. SORENSON: All right. So that will be December 27th.

THE COURT: Okay. Of the 13 -- 14 would be December 27th.

MR. SORENSON: Yes.

THE COURT: All right. What about the word

"substantially"? What was that inserted for?

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MR. SORENSON: Your Honor, only things -- minor 3 things like concerning actual dates, as opposed to the current 4 form of draft -- the current form of notice has been like 35 5 days from date of mailing, as opposed to a date. Obviously, 6 the intent is to substitute an actual date before this went out. Sometimes in final review there are very minor things caught in final proofing, typos or something, and then that would then have to go back to Your Honor for approval again, 10 which can delay things.

We typically have this kind of language. Obviously, 12 nothing is done without the defendants' signoff, and if any 13 issue arises that either side thinks is material as opposed to 14 very trivial, obviously, the intent would always be to come back to Your Honor, but it's really just for that. It's -- it 16 -- we can have some other language if you're uncomfortable, obviously, with "substantially."

It's just that if you say the exact form, then 19∥ parties or lawyers can get concerned if there's very small things that need to be fixed, then we have to go back for formal court approval before sending it out, and -- but if that's what -- obviously, that's what you want, then that's 23 what we'll do.

THE COURT: No, I don't think that's necessary. 25 \parallel just was concerned about the use of the word "substantially." 1 It's not quite vague enough to drive a truck through, but it's 2 -- it -- I've not seen it before in a proposed order. I have 3 no problem with it, knowing all of you. If you feel more $4 \parallel$ comfortable leaving the word "substantially" in, leave it in.

Paragraph 4, postmarked no later than 35 days from 6 mailing. And if I sign the order either today or tomorrow and docket it right away, then I can plug in the 35 days. How long do you think it will take to mail the notice?

MR. SORENSON: I haven't spoken to the 10 \parallel (indiscernible) administrator. It will be done within the 14 Thirty-five days from that is, I think, January 31st. 12 You can plug in that date.

THE COURT: All right. So paragraph 4 will have the date January 31st. And then the paragraph 5, 60 days. would be 60 days from tomorrow.

MR. SORENSON: Right. I have got February 25, 2020. THE COURT: Okay. That takes care of those changes, 18 and fix the way in which the signature line is appended.

MR. SORENSON: Yes. Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Those are the only changes with regard to the order itself. As far as the notice is concerned, the dates on page 8, 35 days from the date of mailing of notice. That would be -- I think you calculated 24 that to be January 31st.

MR. SORENSON: Right.

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THE COURT: Let me just look. Yes.

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And the same on page -- that's paragraph 12, page 8, 3 and then the same date would be inserted in paragraph 12, page $4 \parallel 9$. I think the notice is very good. Have you used one like $5\parallel$ this before? I think the answer is going to be yes. I'd like 6 to hear it.

MR. SORENSON: Yes. Yes, Your Honor. We -- it's 8 very similar to a number of notices in similar cases.

THE COURT: And I think this notice is going to go to 10 I'm going to describe them as sophisticated litigants, a small 11 group, and I think it works.

Is there anything else that we have to address? I've 13 covered what I had in mind.

MR. SORENSON: No, Your Honor. Not from the direct 15 class's standpoint.

THE COURT: All right. Does anyone else have 17 anything to add?

MR. SAINT-ANTOINE: Not from me, Your Honor. This is 19 Paul Saint-Antoine.

THE COURT: Anyone else? The retailer plaintiffs.

MR. PERWIN: No, Your Honor. Scott Perwin.

THE COURT: And how about --

MR. PERWIN: We appreciate being included.

THE COURT: Well, I didn't mean to exclude you.

MR. PERWIN: I understand.

THE COURT: Ms. Kiley, anything? 1 2 MS. KILEY: No, Your Honor. Thank you. 3 THE COURT: And, Ms. Allon, for TEVA? 4 MS. ALLON: No, Your Honor. Thank you. 5 THE COURT: All right. I have nothing else. 6 going through this, you come up with anything, initiate a 7 telephone conference. You don't have to get everyone on, but $8 \parallel$ and I'll get back to you right away. Or send me an email. can do it that way. I think that might be easier. I can get $10 \parallel$ back to you faster that way, and I say that because I just might be tied up in this sentencing. It's a sentencing involving a violation of the Federal Election Law for an 13 election to the House of Representatives, a primary, and it $14 \parallel$ just might take a little longer than I anticipate. 15 So let's proceed that way. I'll expect to get a form 16 of order back by day end. As soon as I get it, I'll sign it and docket it. 18 MR. SORENSON: Your Honor, this is David Sorenson. 19∥You told me at the end you're inclination to set another 20 telephone conference or a status conference in the near future. Can you mention that, or -- I'm just inquiring.

THE COURT: Well, it occurred to me we ought to talk 23 about next steps too. That was the only other thing. 24 a schedule, and I don't think we need to schedule beyond summary -- well, first, let me ask. Is there any -- we debated

1 the need for additional discovery, and I've forgotten how that $2 \parallel$ was left. I don't have in front of me the scheduling files, 3 but what is left? What is next? My recollection is summary judgment.

MR. SORENSON: Yeah.

THE COURT: But --

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MR. SORENSON: Yeah. Yeah, Your Honor, I guess, the 8 End-Payor plaintiffs are not on the phone, so I'll just state then what I -- not only for the decision on their 10 classification motion is still pending --

THE COURT: Yes, it is.

MR. SORENSON: -- and then beyond that, my 13 recollection, I can correct it, is that what's next will be to schedule a summary judgment proceedings and trial, and that has yet to be addressed, and so I just raise it, you know, in terms of what your inclination or desires are in terms of that.

THE COURT: Well, I think we need a telephone 18 conference with the End-Payor plaintiffs, one. The -- it must 19 be obvious from the timing that the End-Payor plaintiffs' class 20 certification motion, it presents a myriad of issues, and we haven't resolved them. I'm not going to say anymore than that now.

I delayed getting back to the issue of scheduling, $24\parallel$ because I wanted to keep the two classes parallel, but I'm not 25 \parallel sure we're going to be able to do that. I'm swamped, is a good 1 word to describe it, but we just got a dozen criminal cases 2 related, which means they're separate cases, and getting a 3 dozen cases at the same time presents all sorts of scheduling 4 issues, like speedy-trial-like issues, because the cases do not $5 \parallel$ involve a conspiracy in which we can charge everyone in the 6 same indictment.

The -- we have trials set for criminal cases, and that came some time ago, and we're kind of struggling to come out from under what we have, but it's eating into the time I 10∥plan to spend on cases like Niaspan. So I'm -- I still haven't decided whether we're going to separate the two and proceed with summary judgment on the Direct -- the DPP class. We're not going to schedule a trial. We're going to schedule through summary judgment, and at the end of that part of the case, we're going to decide the summary judgment motions.

We'll schedule what happens thereafter. Does that answer your question, Mr. Saint-Antoine?

MR. SORENSON: Yes. Yes. Yeah, this is David 19 Sorenson. Yes.

MR. SAINT-ANTOINE: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Oh, Mr. Sorenson.

MR. SORENSON: Would you like to -- so would you like to schedule another status conference on the telephone now, or should we wait to hear from you?

THE COURT: I think we should wait until we get --

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because the next status conference will involve all parties, including the End-Payor, the EPP class. So --

MR. SAINT-ANTOINE: Yes, Your Honor.

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THE COURT: -- that's all we're offering on that, but 5 there's nothing to stop you from preparing a motion for summary 6 judgment. You don't have to have a deadline to start work on it, and I'm sure you've already done that. Again, I'd like to $8 \parallel$ keep the two cases on the same track, and -- but because of this -- well, this sudden, I'm going to call it a drop of 10∥criminal cases, I'm having trouble scheduling, but we're getting through that, and all of the criminal cases are scheduled and we don't have to worry about going through trials 13 at the same time.

I don't know whether you understand how the Speedy Trial Act works. If the defendants are joined in a single indictment, which can be done if there's a conspiracy charge, it's relatively simple, although, you might have to bifurcate. But when you're charged in separate indictments, you need separate trials, and the time spent in separate trials is much, much, much more extensive than the time spent on a single trial with the same number of defendants.

On that note, if there's nothing else that we have to do, I'll end the conference. I'll expect you to get the notice back to me today. I'll sign off on it today or tomorrow, depending upon my schedule and this other criminal case about

1 which I spoke.

So thank you all for making yourselves available on 3 short notice, and I'll expect to hear from you, as I said, this 4 afternoon. Have a --

MR. SORENSON: Yes, Your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: Have a --

MR. SAINT-ANTOINE: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Have a great day.

MR. SORENSON: Thank you.

(Proceedings concluded at 12:11 p.m.)

CERTIFICATION

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I, J. Marie Moran, court-approved transcriber, hereby certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the 5 official electronic sound recording of the proceedings in the above-entitled matter.

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f. Marie Moran

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J. Marie Moran, AAERT NO. 677 DATE: December 23, 2019 10 ACCESS TRANSCRIPTS, LLC

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I, Lisa Luciano, court-approved transcriber, hereby 18 certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the 19 official electronic sound recording of the proceedings in the 20 \parallel above-entitled matter, and to the best of my ability.

<u>CERTIFICATION</u>

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LISA LUCIANO, AAERT NO. 327

DATE:

December 23, 2019

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